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Horizontal Inequalities and
Violent Conflict in Nepal
This paper argues that conflict could occur when horizontal inequalities (HIs) last for a longer
time, as this gives opportunities to political leaders to mobilize dissatisfied caste and ethnic
groups against the state. Using the data of the 1990s and early years of the new millennium,
the study validates the argument by presenting data on four dimensions of the HIs—cultural,
economic, social and political. It examines factors of language and religion for explaining
cultural HIs: poverty, income, and employment related indicators for economic HIs; literacy,
educational attainment and the human development index for social HIs; and participation
in state organs for political HIs. The paper demonstrates that there are high inequalities
among different caste and ethnic groups of Nepal in the four dimensions. The situation of
excluded caste and ethnic groups such as Dalit, Janajati, Madhesi and Muslims is the same as
before or even worsening compared to Brahmin/Chhetri and Newar in those dimensions.

INTRODUCTION
Nepal’s social mosaic is as diverse as its
topography. It has 103 caste and ethnic groups
speaking more than 92 languages. Despite such
diversity, Nepal has never experienced violent
conflict until February 1996 when the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoists) began their people’s war.
The Maoists raised a 40-point list of demands which
were multifarious and covered four aspects: political,
social, cultural and economic transformations.1
These demands were not fulfilled by the government,
and consequently the Maoists began their war in
February 1996. Initially, they raised these demands
on the basis of class inequality and later switched
over to address inequality between caste and ethnic
groups. The conflict was launched at a time when
the economy was growing at a modest rate of around
five percent. This suggests that there was a need
for “growth with equity” —equity among both
individuals and groups.
The effects of Maoist conflict is documented
elsewhere (Tiwari 2009, INSEC 2007, Thapa and
Sinjapati 2004). It had wide ranging effects, the most
critical being the loss of human lives. The conflict killed
13,347 people and damaged properties worth more
than five billion Rupees by the end of 2006. The effect
was greatest in the Mid-Western Development Region
where the conflict started. Judging by the number of
1. The 40-point demand is given in Gurung 2005.

casualties, the intensity of the conflict can be divided
into two phases: (i) a medium intensity conflict until
July 2001, and (ii) a high intensity conflict beginning
in November 2001, with the failure of the first peace
talks held from July to November 2001 followed by
the subsequent mobilization of the army.
The conflict came to an end with the signing of
the comprehensive peace accord (CPA) on November
21, 2006. Some significant achievements have been
made since then; the major ones include most notably
the absence of deadly conflict and an increasing
recognition of marginalized groups, as indicated by
the number of marginalized group representatives in
the new Constituent Assembly and symbolized by
the election of a Madhesi head of state. However,
the struggle for identity recognition and inclusion in
the process of making a new constitution in Nepal is
still ongoing.
The implementation of the CPA and the
restoration of lasting peace require that the reasons
for the decade-long Maoist conflict be addressed.
Some studies have been conducted on this subject,
but most of them either lack empirical footing
or are inconclusive. Those that are empirically
based are not conclusive: some point to poverty
and underdevelopment while others advance
landlessness as the reasons behind the conflict.
This divergence is due to differences in approach
and methodology. Most of the empirical studies use
district level data on poverty and wellbeing related
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indicators and make an attempt to explain conflict measured
in terms of the number of people killed and displaced or
by some other measure of insecurity. Additionally, there are
some studies that present data on exclusion and inequality by
different caste and ethnic group and by gender, but they do
not establish a connection between inequality and conflict.
In fact, there is a dearth of detailed empirical studies on
horizontal inequality (HI) as an explanation for the conflict in
Nepal. In view of this shortcoming, the present study makes
an attempt to understand it from the lens of exclusion and
inequality of different caste and ethnic groups—a variant of
HIs—in Nepal.
This paper argues that enduring horizontal inequality
provided a basis for the Maoists to mobilize various groups
with grievances. In order to develop this argument, the
paper is organized into four sections. The next section
of the paper considers the concept and role of horizontal
inequality and distinguishes it from the traditional concept
of inequality among individuals which Stewart (2000) calls
vertical inequality. The third section reviews the literature
on the relationship between such inequality and conflict in
Nepal and identifies the gap in the knowledge of the subject.
Subsequently, the Section provides empirical evidence of
inequality in four dimensions across the various caste and
ethnic groups to support the argument of the paper that
horizontal inequality offered the ground for violent conflict
in Nepal. The final section summarizes key findings in order
to provide an explanation for the rise of conflict.

THE CONCEPT OF HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES
Horizontal inequalities (HIs) refer to inequalities between
socio-culturally defined groups with shared identities
formed around religion, ethnic ties or racial or caste-based
affiliations. It is distinguished from vertical inequality, a
term coined by Frances Stewart (2000), which refers to
inequality mostly between individuals within an otherwise
homogenous population. Thus, vertical inequalities focus
on individuals, whereas horizontal inequalities refer to
inequalities between groups. Horizontal inequalities are
multidimensional and encompass economic, social, cultural
and political dimensions as follows:
• The economic dimension includes inequalities
in ownership of assets, income and employment
opportunities.
• The social dimension covers inequalities in access
to a range of services and in their human outcomes
(including education, health and nutrition).
• The political dimension consists of inequalities
in the distribution of political opportunities and
power across the groups at different levels, including
political, bureaucratic and military power.
• The cultural dimension refers to differences in
recognition and hierarchical status of the cultural
norms, customs and practices of different groups
(Stewart. et al. 2007; Langer and Brown 2007).
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Each of these dimensions is important in itself, but any one
of them can also hamper progress made in other dimensions.
Horizontal inequalities are closely related to the concept
of social exclusion, and the two concepts are at times used
interchangeably. Unequal societies in which certain groups
are discriminated against can lead to the exclusion of those
groups. Similarly, social exclusion fuels inequality between
groups. Like horizontal inequalities, social exclusion is
multidimensional, encompassing social, economic and
political forms of exclusion. However, horizontal inequalities
are not always severe enough to lead to a situation defined as
social exclusion. Policies and initiatives to reduce horizontal
inequalities and social exclusion can be quite similar; both
take a multidimensional approach and generally target groups
rather than individuals.2

The Role of Horizontal Inequalities in Conflict
The contemporary rational choice literature on the origins
of conflict and civil war offers two possible explanations: (i)
grievance and (ii) greed or opportunities. The first refers to
historical injustices and inter-group inequalities in economic,
social and political rights, and the second explanation
emphasizes the role of rents, which are occasionally lootable, in producing inter-group rivalry for their control. Both
of these ultimately can result in war. Similarly, Collier and
Hoeffler (1999) grouped potential causes of conflict into two
groups: the quest for justice and the quest for loot. Of these
two explanations, the grievance approach is more relevant for
explaining the Maoist conflict in Nepal.
Horizontal inequalities support the grievance approach
and originate in the theory of relative deprivation. Primarily
influenced by the work of Gurr (1970), Stewart (2000)
advanced horizontal inequalities as the reason behind
grievances felt by excluded groups which, when mobilized by
“conflict entrepreneurs,” can erupt into violent conflict.3
However, several studies conducted in different parts of the
world provide reasons other than horizontal inequalities as the
cause of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004b), and Fearon and
Laitin (2003) found that poorer countries face greater risk of
conflict; however, their interpretation is different. Collier and
Hoeffler argue that the low opportunity cost for rebels and the
large stock of easily expropriated natural resources or primary
commodities in an area are the motivating factors behind
the conflict. On the other hand, Fearon and Laitin hold that
conflict develops in poor countries because they have weak
governance due to a lack of resources, as suggested by Deng
(2004). Langer (2005) also points to the fact that people—both
rich and poor—in many societies and states have been living
together in harmony for generations without any violent conflict
among them. But this refers to cases of vertical inequality or
2. http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/social-exclusion/linksbetween-social-exclusion-and-inequality
3. Stewart et al. (2006) used the word ‘conflict entrepreneur’. This
refers to unsatisfied leaders who mobilise groups with grievances for conflict.

inequality among individuals. Against this backdrop, the
main argument of this paper is that an individual deprived of
political, economic, social and cultural rights cannot revolt, but
a deprived group can fight against the state if it is mobilized by
a political party or leaders.
Therefore, Ostby (2004) suggests that the inequality-conflict
nexus needs to be investigated both vertically and horizontally,
with more refined measures of various dimensions of inequality.
The main objective of her paper is to explore whether or not
horizontal inequality affects the probability of civil conflict
when tested quantitatively across many cases. Using data from
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for 33 developing
countries, Ostby constructs aggregated macro-indicators
for inequality between the two largest ethnic groups in each
country along three dimensions: social, economic and healthrelated. She also generates measures of ethnic fractionalization
and polarization based on the DHS data. The main findings
of her study are: (i) social horizontal inequality is positively
related to conflict outbreak; and (ii) ethnic composition and
inequality between individuals are not significant explanations
for conflict. Therefore, she concludes that it is too early to reject
the inequality–conflict nexus and that future conflict studies
should also explore the concept of “horizontal polarization”.
Stewart (2005b) argues that reducing inequalities between
groups should be a significant aspect of policy making in
the post-conflict period. The paper argues that the types
of policies aimed at reducing group inequalities are fairly
common in ethnically divided societies. They are of two types:
(i) policies designed for correcting unfair processes, and (ii)
positive discriminatory policies such as the use of quotas
and targets. These policies have been effective in Malaysia
and North Ireland in sustaining or promoting peace. Despite
their importance in many post-conflict situations, the author
points out that they rarely form an explicit part of the postconflict development agenda. Stewart (2005b) illustrated this
point by reviewing general statements about post-conflict
policies and examining two case studies—Mozambique and
Guatemala—where horizontal inequalities were one of the
sources of conflict. She found that HIs have been ignored in
post-conflict Mozambique where in fact most policies have
tended to accentuate the inequality. In Guatemala some of the
peace protocols contained provisions for correcting horizontal
inequalities but they have not been put into effect. This is
mainly because political obstacles prevented such policies from
being adopted. The author suggests that such policies need
to be adopted with political sensitivity as they can become a
source of conflict themselves, as in the case of Sri Lanka.
While there has been considerable analysis of the impact
of structural adjustment policies on poverty and inequality
among individuals, there has been almost none on the impact
of structural adjustment on inequality between culturally
defined groups. Therefore, Langer et al. (2007) point out that
socio-economic inequality among groups is important from
a number of perspectives – it can have adverse effects on
the wellbeing of members of deprived groups, it can impede
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efficiency, it may make it very difficult to eradicate poverty,
lead to unfair and exclusionary societies, and increase the
risk of violent conflict. Hence, the authors suggest that it is
important to analyze the impact of structural adjustment
policies on horizontal inequality.
Langer and Brown (2007) analyze the relationship
between culture and conflict within the broader framework of
horizontal inequalities. Their paper argues that an important
link between culture and group mobilization, including violent
conflict, is the extent to which cultural groups’ practices and
customs are differentially recognized in and by the state.
Differences in the status afforded to different cultures by the
state, whether implicitly or explicitly, and popular perceptions
of and anxieties over differences in cultural status constitute
a dimension of horizontal inequalities. The authors describe
them as cultural status inequalities. Moreover, the paper
argues that the most dangerous situations exist where all
three dimensions of horizontal inequality – socioeconomic,
political and cultural status – run in the same direction, or
are consistent.
In summary, the research conducted by CRISE and some
others suggest that horizontal inequality is more likely to
provoke conflict when:4
• it is not only sustained, but also widens over time.
• it is consistent across four dimensions.
• group boundaries are relatively impermeable. If
there is easy mobility across group boundaries, then
inequalities can be overcome at the individual level if
not at the group level, by individuals “joining” the more
privileged group.
• there are fairly large numbers of people in different
groups. If the underprivileged group is very small,
then the chances of successfully advancing their
position through conflict may also be small (or the
conflict can be easily suppressed), making violent
conflict less likely.
• aggregate incomes are stagnant or slow growing, so
that there is little or no improvement in the absolute
economic and social position of the deprived.
• groups are sufficiently cohesive enabling collective
action to emerge.
• leaders emerge and are not incorporated into the
ruling system; this is particularly likely to be the
case where there is political inequality (or political
exclusion of some groups).
• the government is irresponsive (or, worse,
proactively
and
violently
repressive)
and
consequently there is no redress for problems
through
peaceful
means
(Stewart
2005a).
Using data gathered from eight country case studies,
4. See www.crise.ox.ac.uk for research by CRISE on horizontal
inequality.
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Stewart et al. (2007) held that horizontal inequality can cause
conflict when there is inequality among the socio-cultural
groups (Box 1). In summary, they advanced the idea that
horizontal inequality is a multidimensional concept, and it
can be an important source of conflict, especially where the
inequalities are consistent across the four dimensions. While
social and economic horizontal inequality generally generates
fertile ground for conflict to emerge, and cultural status
inequality acts to bind groups together, political inequality
between groups provides incentives for leaders to mobilize
people for rebellion. Conditions of severe socio-economic
inequality, abrupt changes in political inequality, or cultural
events (in which important cultural or religious symbols
are attacked) often constitute powerful triggers to conflict
(Stewart et al. 2007: 432–33).
It is generally accepted that none of the four dimensions
act alone, but that it is the dynamics, or interplay between
them that can lead to violence. For example, political and
economic inequalities can enable elites to manipulate ethnic
or religious identities into violent conflict. Natural resources
may not cause conflict, but they may prolong it, and are often
central to the political economy of war.

HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES AND THE MAOIST
CONFLICT IN NEPAL
Most of the studies conducted on the causes of the Nepali
conflict do not employ horizontal inequalities as tools of
analysis. Generally, they have proposed economic inequality
among individuals or spatial inequality (as measured by the
poverty rate or gini coefficient of income or assets such as
land) rather than inequality between the social or cultural
groups as the reason for conflict (Karmacharya and Sharma
2003, Pandey 2000). Others have described exclusion and
inequality with a focus on the excluded groups (Lawoti 2002,
Neupane 2005, and DFID and World Bank 2006), but they do
not directly link this with the conflict. However, this paper
reviews only those which deal with horizontal inequalities or
have alluded to horizontal inequalities. Readers interested in
other studies can find a brief review in Tiwari (2009).
Gradstein and Milanovic (2004) found that social
exclusion is common in Nepal and has been the fundamental
reason why Maoists received support from excluded groups.
Exclusion is along overlapping caste, ethnic and geographic
lines. Abrupt political transitions and inexperience with
democratic processes in general tend to exacerbate entrenched
social exclusions within society.
Murshed and Gates (2005) argue that Nepal’s development
process has neglected agriculture, and rural poverty is
exacerbated by high levels of landlessness, despite some
unsuccessful attempts at land reform in the 1950s and 1960s.
Loopholes allowed large landowners to continue to control
the most land. According to the 2001 census 1.2 million, or
around one quarter of the total households in Nepal, do not
own land. The authors found a positive association between
landlessness and intensity of conflict.
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Box 1: What does the evidence show about the relationship
between Horizontal Inequalities and conflict?
Based on 8 country studies from three regions of the world and
some inter-country analysis of a broader range of countries, the
following are the major findings on the relationship between
HIs and conflict.
1. The probability of conflict occurring rises where
socioeconomic horizontal inequalities and exclusion are higher
2. Conflict is more likely where political and
socioeconomic HIs are high and exist together.
3. Inclusive (or power-sharing) governments tend
to reduce the likelihood of conflict.
4. Inequality of cultural recognition among groups is an
additional motivation for conflict.
5. Perceptions of horizontal inequalities affect the likelihood of
conflict
6. The presence of natural resources can be a significant cause of
separatist conflict, as well as of local conflict,
often working through the impact this has on HIs.
8. The nature of the state and the role of the government are of
enormous importance to whether or not serious conflict erupts
and persists.
9. International policies and statistics are too often blind to the
issue of HIs.
Stewart et al. 2007

There is also inequality in access to formal sector jobs.
Civil service employment reflects caste differences. The
Brahman-Chhetri-Newar ethnic groups dominate the
highest job levels such as the Secretary and Joint Secretary of
government ministries and departments as 87 percent of all
university graduates are from the higher status ethnic groups
and castes. Many jobs are said to be allocated according to
social connections. Democratization in 1990 appears to
have increased corruption and nepotism and weakened legal
institutions (Pandey 2000).
Lawoti is one among few Nepali researchers who pursued
inequalities between caste and ethnic groups in the later
years of the conflict. In his 2007 study he argues that overcentralization of the polity was the underlying cause of
the multiple violent and nonviolent conflicts and crises in
Nepal. Governance structures, including the first-past-thepost electoral system and the centralizing political culture,
concentrated power in the center. Moreover, centralized power
was mostly concentrated in the executive body and accessed
largely by Brahman and Chhetri castes of the Hills. This overcentralization contributed to abuse of power, corruption,

erosion of democratic institutions, and governmental
instability. He argues that centralization also contributed to
ethnic exclusion and conflicts. However, the study does not
show the relationship between horizontal inequalities and
conflict.
The first important study looking empirically into the
relation between horizontal inequality and conflict in Nepal
is by Murshed and Gates (2005). It suggests that grievances
rather than greed are the main motivating force and that
horizontal and inter-group inequality is central in explaining
social conflict in Nepal. The conflict has both caste and ethnic
dimensions. Additionally, the study found that the intensity
of conflict is considerably higher in the mid- and far-western
development regions of Nepal where there is lack of human
development and considerable inequality in the distribution
of land. According to the authors, ethnicity mobilizes groups
to fight each other, and that ethnicity, whether based on
language, religion or some other form, is a far more powerful
catalyst for conflict than is social class. The authors found
that grievance is rooted in deep inter-group disparities
encompassing: (i) asset inequality, (ii) unequal access to
public employment and public services, (iii) over-taxation,
and (iv) economic mis-management. Thus, they inferred
that development strategies failed to meet the challenges of
poverty and the reduction of horizontal inequality.
Hatlebakk (2007), who excludes the Tarai districts plus
Rolpa and Rukum from his analysis, estimated a Poisson
regression model with level of conflict as the dichotomous
variable. He denies the finding described by Murshed and
Gates (2005) that landlessness has a positive influence on the
level of conflict. He separates “Maoist control” from “level of
conflict” in these districts, and finds that poverty, in contrast
to landlessness, explains Maoist influence.5 Thus, he found
that districts with more landless people are less likely to be
affected by conflict, as measured by the number of casualties
and displacements. He points out that Murshed and Gates
(2005) found a positive correlation between landlessness and
conflict because they used the actual number of killings per
person of a district as the dependent variable and estimated
regression for all 75 districts including Rolpa and Rukum
where the largest numbers of people were killed. He also
shows that if Rolpa and Rukum are excluded then their
positive relationship disappears. Therefore, he argued that it
is because of methodological fallacies, viz, the inclusion of
outlier districts, viz. Rolpa and Rukum, such a correlation
appears.
While Murshed and Gates (2005) found that grievance
due to land inequality is the motivating force for conflict and
5. Hatlebakk (2007) distinguishes between the terms “Maoist control”
and “level of conflict”: the former refers to the districts where Maoists gained
control by establishing their own government, and the latter refers to the
number of people killed or displaced in a district. He separated these two
concepts because the districts where Maoists have established their control
do not necessarily have a higher number of casualties.
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that Nepal’s conflict has ethnic and caste dimensions, Do and
Iyer (2007) found higher conflict intensity in the districts
with higher poverty or lower level of economic development,
but weaker evidence that caste and ethnic divisions and
linguistic diversity are correlated with intensity of civil
conflict.
Using district level data of 72 districts, Tiwari (2007)
estimated two regression models with two separate
dependent variables used to measure the conflict: (i) a
logit model with level of insecurity as a dummy dependent
variable – districts with conflict were assigned a value of one
and districts without conflict were assigned a zero value; and
(ii) a linear regression model with number of people killed
as the dependent variable. The specification of the “level of
insecurity” is based on the stages of conflict as defined by the
UN system in Nepal. Districts at stage 3 have been considered
districts with conflict, and those with stages 1 and 2 were
thought of as without conflict because in the latter two stages
the UN continues its operations throughout the district.6
Based on the two models, Tiwari (2007) found that in
addition to poverty and food security, caste polarization is
also correlated with conflict.7 In particular the author found
that districts with a higher proportion of Janajatis (Indigenous
people) have a lower level of insecurity/conflict. Therefore,
this study corroborates the findings of Gurung (2005). Given
the fact that the poverty rate among Janajati is higher than
that among Brahman and Newar in Nepal; this at first glance
suggests that poverty is not the sole reason for the conflict.
However, when poverty is coupled with other grievances,
conflict could erupt. But this requires group cohesion and
mobilization against the state, and therefore a need to study
horizontal inequalities .
Ostby (2004) points out that various studies have come
up with different results mainly because of methodological
differences. However, civil wars occur when groups mobilize
against each other; their leaders use ethnicity, or some other
characteristic like religion, to unite and mobilize the group.
Such mobilization is effective where there are substantial
horizontal inequalities rather than vertical inequality
(Stewart 2000). This suggests that horizontal inequalities
are more important than vertical inequality for the onset and
6. The UN classified districts in Nepal according to their security
situations as they apply to UN personnel. There are five phases of
security, starting with phase one with the lowest insecurity and five with
the highest insecurity, as follows: Phase 1: warning; phase 2: restricted
movement; phase 3: relocation; phase 4: emergency operation; and phase
5: evacuations. As of December 2, 2004, the UN classified districts within
three phases: 38 districts in phase one; one district in phase two; and 36
districts in phase three. For further details see (Tiwari 2007 and 2009).
7. Here poverty refers to head count poverty rate; food security is
measured as the rate of stunted growth among children under five, and
caste polarization is measured by the proportion of Janajati to the total
population. Generally, the districts with a larger proportion of Janajati have
less caste polarization.
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continuation of civil war.
The studies reviewed above have the following lacunae:
1. Some are static, presenting data collected at one point
in time, and thus fail to validate the reasons for conflict;
2. Some others depict the inequality but hardly link it
with its possible consequences such as violent conflict;
3. Several studies are descriptive and lack empirical
analysis;
4. Most of the studies have a spatial focus;
Most of the studies are not conclusive; moreover there is
dissimilarity in their results partly because of the differences
in the methodology and partly because of the lack of a
comprehensive conceptual framework.
This study fills the gaps noted above by taking a systematic
presentation and analysis of horizontal inequality in its four
dimensions and linking them to the conflict. The study is
cognizant of the fact that horizontal inequalities cannot
of themselves result in violent conflict unless “conflict
entrepreneurs” mobilize groups to ignite conflict. Thus,
horizontal inequalities provide an environment where
conflicts can begin and thrive.

Horizontal Inequality in Nepal
The Maoist conflict in Nepal was not a sudden event. It
was an organized conflict initiated as early as 1996 and it
continued for more than a decade. A conflict triggered by a
leader cannot be sustained unless there is constant socioeconomic inequality between different groups. Consequently,
the present paper advances the following two interrelated
arguments which suggest a reason for the conflict in Nepal.
• Conflict is more likely to occur where there are
significant cultural, political and socio-economic
horizontal inequalities between different caste and
ethnic groups; and
• conflict is more likely to occur when horizontal
inequalities are being sustained or are widening across
caste and ethnic groups.
In order to advance these two arguments, the paper
uses data collected in the 1990s and the early years of the
new millennium when the conflict expanded and reached
its pinnacle in 2002. The method adopted is to present
various socio-economic indicators and political participation
indicators across caste and ethnic groups at two points in time
and find out how unequal the groups are in terms of these
indicators. Secondary data has been used from following
surveys:
• Population census 1991 and 2001
• Nepal living standards survey (NLSS) 1995/96 and
2003/04
• Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) 2006
As a single survey does not cover all dimensions of
inequality, it is difficult to use the same two points in time
for comparison across all the dimensions. Thus, income,
expenditure and poverty are compared for the years 1995/96
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and 2003/04 using NLSS data, whereas literacy and education
are presented and contrasted for 1991 and 2001 based on
census data. The human development index is estimated
primarily based on the 2006 NDHS data. Additionally,
political participation is compared for the years 1999 and
2006 using data extracted from Lawoti (2007) and Neupane
(2005).

The Social Mosaic of Nepal
Horizontal inequality has not been well researched in
Nepal because data classified by caste and ethnicity was not
collected in the population census until 1991. Therefore,
there is still a lack of adequate data on different dimensions
of welfare organized in terms of these rubrics.
The 2001 census in Nepal recorded a population of
23,151,423 people, of whom 51 percent were female.8 The
cultural and social mosaic as presented in Annex 1 reveals
that Nepal is not a country with a simple majority-minority.
However, Hinduism is the dominant religion and Nepali is
spoken by a little less than half the population. The country
has recently been declared a secular state along with several
other transitions including its declaration as a republic.
Further details are given in UNDP/Nepal (2009).
Household sample surveys collect information from a
limited number of samples. This is hardly enough to estimate
the values of indicators for 103 caste and ethnic groups.
Therefore, generally these groups are merged into around 11
broader categories in order to use survey data to estimate and
analyze horizontal inequality.
Various studies have grouped caste and ethnicity
somewhat differently. However, across most of the studies,
the three major groups that appear common are Janajati,
Brahman and Chhetri, and Dalits which comprise around
37%, 33% and 12% of the total population, respectively
(Lawoti 2007, UNDP/RIPP and NTG 2006, and DFID and
World Bank 2006). Besides, the one group, which has a larger
share is “Tarai Middle castes” holding about 13 percent of
total population (DFID and World Bank 2006). While most
Brahman, Chhetris and Dalits speak Nepali, Janajatis speak
different languages such as Tamang and Magar. Additionally,
a larger number of other Nepali people speak Newari, Maithili
and Bhojpuri (Annex 1).
Following the DFID and World Bank (2006) classification,
this paper uses 7 groups and 11 sub-groups for the analysis of
horizontal inequality mainly in three dimensions: political,
social and economic. The following sections first describe
the cultural dimension followed by the economic, social and
political dimensions.

Cultural Discrimination
In contemporary Nepal, gender, caste and ethnicity are
8. However, because of the conflict, the population census was not
conducted in all the settlements and therefore information was enumerated
for only 22,736,934 people.

major defining categories and sources of individual identity.
The Nepal Human Development Report 2009 outlines
seven types of exclusion and discrimination, including
caste, ethnicity, region and gender-based discriminations
(UNDP/Nepal 2009). Caste-based discrimination involves
discrimination against Dalits; the region-based discrimination
is against Madhesi, and ethnicity-based discrimination is
against the 59 indigenous nationalities that do not fall into
the caste system in Nepal. Therefore, the excluded groups
in Nepal, in addition to women and the people of the midWestern and Far Western development regions, are the
Janajati, Madhesi, and Dalits. However, women are not
subject to horizontal inequalities, and the spatial inequality
has been well researched in the past. Therefore, they are not
discussed here.
Cultural discrimination on the following three grounds
helped to promote the formation of cultural identity in the
past: (i) differential treatment (formal and informal) with
respect to religion and religious observation, (ii) differential
recognition of languages, and (iii) and differential treatment
of ethno-cultural practices. The cultural differences of
mountain, hill and Tarai, are also strong factors in identity
formation, and creating differences between the people of
Tarai and the Hills of Nepal.
The “one religion, one language and one culture” policy
of the state in the past ignored the cultural diversity, creating
cultural exclusion through the lack of national recognition
of other languages and of symbols like the dress and food
of other ethnic groups. This primarily affected the Janajatis
(who are almost 37 percent of the population, speak more
than 80 languages or dialects, follow animism and have
distinct cultural practices) and the Madhesis (who are
linguistically and socially very diverse and follow different
food and cultural practices than the people of the hills). The
symbolism of dress has also created deep resentments e.g. the
hill topi (a cap) is considered “Nepali,” and the Madhesi dhoti
is considered “Indian,” which created identity issues for the
Madhesis. This lack of recognition of linguistic and cultural
diversity created a deep sense of disrespect and frustration
among the Janajatis and Madhesis who felt undermined and
humiliated. These cultural manifestations of differences
have been present for generations. Cultural discrimination
against certain groups served as a basis of solidarity to move
against the state. Besides this, the caste- and gender-based
discriminations also contributed to move against the state
(see for detail UNDP/Nepal 2009).

Inequality in Economic Outcomes
This section presents data on poverty, income, consumption
and employment levels in eleven caste and ethnic groups and
examines the level of economic inequality among them.
Poverty and Inequality
Table 1 provides the estimates of the level of poverty in
eleven caste and ethnic groups at two points in time: 1995/96
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and 2003/04. It shows that only 19 percent of Newar were
poor as opposed to 58 percent of Dalits in 1995/96. The
percent of Janajati living in poverty was between these two
groups with levels ranging from 49 percent in the Hills to 53
percent among Tarai Janajati. Only three caste groups had a
poverty rate of one third or less, whereas the rest were above
the national average of 42 percent in 1995/96. The economic
situation of these caste and ethnic groups did not change
in 2003/04 even after a period of 8 years. Dalits are at the
bottom with the highest percent living in poverty (46%),
and Newar had the lowest level of poverty (14%) in 2003/04
(Table 1). In fact, poverty rate among the caste and ethnic
groups varies more widely than among the regions (See
Annex 2 for spatial inequality).
This demonstrates that there is high economic inequality
among different caste and ethnic groups. Moreover, the inequality
is not decreasing over time. This is because the decrease in
poverty is uneven: a rapid decrease occurred among advantaged
castes like the Brahman, Chhetri and Newar (BCN), whereas
a slow decline was found among Janajati, Dalits and Muslims
between 1995/96 and 2003/04. Among the Janajatis, the rate of
decline varies widely, with a higher reduction in poverty among
Tarai Janajati than among their Hill counterparts.
Consequently, the Gini Coefficient, a measure of
inequality, has increased from 0.34 in 1995/96 to 0.41 in
2003/04. Thus, in spite of a decrease in poverty across
all caste and ethnic groups, there is a wide gap between
the poverty rates of different groups. Dalits, Muslims and
some indigenous peoples were the most deprived groups in
1995/96, and they still were in 2003/04.
Apart from the incidence of poverty, its depth and severity
is also highest among Dalits and certain Janajatis (Table 1).9
This shows a persistence of poverty and inequality among
excluded groups in Nepal. The inherent reason for the highest
levels of poverty among excluded groups is rooted in the
asset-based inequality which is not discussed in this paper.10
However, an attempt has been made to look further into their
consumption/income in the following section.
9. There are three measures of poverty: incidence, depth and severity,
popularly known as FGT measures. while poverty incidence, also called as
head count rate, shows the proportion of population below a poverty line,
the other two poverty measures show depth or quality of poverty.
10. According to the NLSS 2003/04, the poverty rate was higher
in landless households, households with a larger family size or a larger
number of children and among the households with illiterate heads. In fact,
the rate was found to decrease with increase in the size of holding, decrease
in family size or number of dependents, and increase in year of schooling of
heads, implying that apart from spatial and horizontal variation, the level of
poverty also varies because of other characteristics (CBS 2005).
By occupational groups, poverty is highest among agriculture
wage laborers followed by self-cultivating agriculture operators. In fact,
the poverty rates among agricultural wage laborers remained virtually
unchanged (56% in 1995/96 and 54% in 2003/04). This also implies that
those who were poor before remain poor still.
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Inequality in Income and Consumption
Like the poverty rate, the level of consumption also varied
widely across different caste and ethnic groups in the years
1995/96 and 2003/04. Within this period, the consumption
level increased for all groups but the increase was much
larger for Newars and Brahman/Chhetris than Dalits. This
implies that the consumption gap among different caste and
ethnic groups has widened over time.11 Moreover, a significant

have much less than a proportionate share in all non-agricultural
spheres including government service. The Janajati, with a 37
percent share of the total population in 2001, held only 3 percent
of technical positions and half a percent of administrative
positions. Dalits make up 12 percent of the population but
hold three percent of technical positions and 0.3 percent of
administrative professions (Annex 4). One reason why Dalits
occupy a higher percentage of technical positions than Janajati
is because they run their own technical enterprises including
sewing, shoe making and iron related activities. Compared to
these two groups, the employment opportunities for Brahmans,
Chhetri and Newar are better. There was an increase in the labor
force participation in administrative and technical occupations
between 1996 and 2001. However, the rate of increase does
not correspond to that of the share of Dalit and Janajati peoples
in the total population.

inequality in annual per capita income was found in 2003/04. It
ranges from NRs. 8,830 among Hill Dalits to NRs. 23,900 among
the Tarai Brahman and Chhetri. Even within the same caste and
ethnic group, wide variation in income exists between the subgroups and the rural and urban areas. The annual per capita
income of a rural Brahman is just NRs. 15,674 which is less than
half of the urban Brahman’s per capita income. The discrepancy
is even higher among the Newar. Among Dalits, the discrepancy
is smaller, and smaller still among Muslim households where the
per capita income of urban and rural Muslims is NRs. 11,563
and NRs. 10,126, respectively (Annex 3).
The wealthy in Nepal are those who do not adopt agriculture as
their main occupation. They generally belong to Brahmin/Chhetri
and Newar groups. These people mostly work as professional and
administrative workers. On the other hand, the disadvantaged
caste and ethnic groups such as the Dalits, Janajati and Madhesi

Inequality in Social Outcomes
Apart from economic inequality between groups, there is also
social inequality. This is due to the inter-dependence of different
types of capital and capabilities as explained by Stewart (2009).
This section presents data on only two capabilities: literacy and
educational attainment.

Table 1: Incidence of Poverty by Caste and Ethnic Groups, Nepal 1995-96 and 2003-04
Caste and Ethnic
Groups
Brahman/Chhetri
Tarai Middle
Castes
Dalit
Newar
Hill Janajati
Tarai Janajati
Muslim
Other
Total

Poverty Headcount Rate

Distribution of the Poor

Distribution of Population

1995-96

2003-04

Change
in %

1995-96

2003-04

Change
in %

1995-96

2003-04

Change
in %

34.1

18.4

-46

26.7

15.7

-41

32.7

26.3

-20

28.7

21.3

-26

2.9

1.9

-33

4.2

2.8

-34

57.8
19.3
48.7
53.4
43.7
46.1
41.8

45.5
14.0
44.0
35.4
41.3
31.3
30.8

-21
-28
-10
-34
-6
-32
-26

10.6
2.5
19.7
10.4
5.7
21.4
100

10.9
3.4
27.8
9.2
8.7
22.3
100

3
35
41
-12
53
4
-

7.7
5.5
16.9
8.2
5.4
19.4
100

7.4
7.5
19.5
8.1
6.5
21.9
100

-4
38
16
-1
19
13
-

Note: The trends in poverty rates across caste-ethnic groups should be treated with caution.
Source: CBS 2005.

11. The multivariate analysis of consumption patterns among different
caste and ethnic groups indicates that the socially excluded groups have
to pay a ‘caste/ethnic penalty’. Even when the effect of factors such as the
household size, the number of children in the household, the household
head’s occupation and level of education, land ownership, receipt of
remittances, residence, ecological location, etc., are controlled, the average
per capita consumption of groups which have suffered from social exclusion
remains much lower than those of Newars and Brahman/Chhetris (DFID and
World Bank 2006). This is the result of direct and indirect discrimination of
the excluded groups in Nepali society.
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The literacy rate is lower among Dalits and religious
minorities, including Muslims. It is highly unequal: only eleven
percent of Tarai Dalits were literate compared to 59 percent of
Tarai Brahman and Chhetri. The situation has not improved
even after a decade. Even in 2001, the Tarai Dalits had the lowest
proportion of literate individuals and the Tarai Brahman and
Chhetri had the highest. In fact, between 1991 and 2001, the
increase in the literacy rate was generally hovering between 10
to 14 percent for most of the caste and ethnic groups. And it is
disheartening to note that the Tarai Dalit had the lowest increase
at only 10 percent – merely one percent annual increase in the

literacy rate during the 1990s (Table 2).

The inequality in educational attainment seems to be
unequal when the proportion of university graduate of a caste
or ethnic group is compared to the group’s percent of the
total population as given in Table 3. For example, Brahman
and Chhetris made up about 34 percent of the population;
however, they had about 59 percent of graduates in the country
in 1991. On the other hand, Dalits, with about 12 percent of
the population, made up less than one percent of graduates.
In fact, the educational situation of Dalits remained the same
compared to other caste and ethnic groups during the decade
1991 – 2001. On the other hand, the proportion of graduates
from the Brahman and Chhetri group increased from 59 to 67
percent. Thus, Dalits still have educational attainment levels
far below those of the Brahman and Chhetri. Following the
Dalits, Muslims and Janajatis have lower levels of educational
attainment. In fact, the proportion of the population with
School Leaving Certificates (SLC) and university graduate
degrees decreased among Janajatis from 1991 to 2001 (Table
3).

Caste/Ethnicity and Human Development
The UNDP has used the human development index (HDI)
as an all-encompassing measure of human development.
Using data from the 2006 Nepal Demographic and Heath
Survey, HDI estimates for 11 caste and ethnic groups are
presented in Table 4. The comparison of HDI by caste and
ethnicity shows that HDI varies widely across the groups.
In fact, this variation is wider than the differences in HDI
between geographical areas (see UNDP/Nepal 2009 for
details). This points to a need to examine caste and ethnicity
within a particular region. For example, in the Tarai, Dalits
have the lowest HDI value, whereas Brahman and Chhetri
have the highest (0.383 vs. 0.625).
The people of three caste and ethnic groups—Tarai/
Madhesi Brahman/Chhetri, Newar and Hill Brahman—have
higher HDI values (0.6 and above) than those of the Dalits,
both from the Hills and the Tarai. Muslims have an index
value of less than 0.425—lower than that for Dalits as a
whole, but higher than the values for Tarai Dalits (Table 4).
These results are very similar to those of the inclusion index
constructed by Bennett and Parajuli (2008).12
Of the three components of the HDI, education is the most
significant factor. This accounts for the wide gap between the
Brahman/Chhetri and the other castes. The lower HDI for
Dalits, especially Tarai Dalits and Muslims, is largely derived
from their very low educational attainment levels compared
to other components of HDI (Table 4). Their low human
12. Of the 11 caste and ethnic groups, Madhesi Dalit was found to be
the most excluded group, followed by Hill Dalits, Muslims and then Tarai
and Hill Janajatis, respectively. Inclusion index values ranged from 19%
among Madhesi Dalits to as high as 94% among the Newars, reflecting high
discrimination between caste and ethnic groups.
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development or capability, as determined by this index,
hinders their representation and participation in state and
society– which, in turn, perpetuates their low level of human
development. Unless broken by the state, this cycle can only
continue.

Unequal Participation in State Organs
There is an unequal representation of different caste and
ethnic groups in state organs and various elements of society
including the executive, judicial and legislative branches of
government, constitutional bodies, public service, political
party leadership, local government heads and the heads of
industrial, commercial, academic, professional, cultural,
science and technology, and civil society associations.
Table 2: Literacy Rate of Individuals 6 Years and
above by Caste and Ethnic Groups, 1991 and 2001
Caste and Ethnic
Groups
All Hill/Tarai
Brahman/Chhetri
(B/C)
Hill B/C
Tarai B/C
Tarai Middle Castes
Dalit
Hill Dalit
Tarai Dalit
Janajatis
Hill Janajati
Newar/Thakali
Other Hill Janajati
Tarai Janajati
Religious
Minorities/Muslims
Others
Total

Literacy Rate
1991
2001

Increase
(%)

53.1

67.5

14.4

52.6
59.4
29.6
22.6
26.8
11
40
43.1
61

67.1
73.9
41.7
33.8
41.9
21.1
53.6
56.2
72.2

14.5
14.5
12.1
11.2
15.1
10.1
13.6
13.1
11.2

38.2
28.7
23.1

52.1
44.8
34.5

13.8
16.1
11.3

25.6
40.1

50.1
53.7

24.5
13.7

Source: TPAMF 2005.

The situation in Nepal regarding participation
in the Supreme Court and cabinet by different caste
and ethnic groups is also unequal. The Brahman and
Chhetri, comprising one-third of the population, occupy
about three quarters of the positions on the Supreme
Court and council of ministers. Somewhat similar is
the situation for the Newar. On the other hand, Dalits
and Janajatis have been further marginalized and their
situation has not improved over time (Table 5). Thus, men
in the hill Brahman/Chhetri group and Newars dominate all
three state organs: legislature, executive and judiciary.
It is important to note that in the history of Nepal after
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1951, all but one of the prime ministers (a Newar) came from
the Brahman and Chhetri group (Lawoti 2007). Most of the
opposition party leaders in parliament have also happened to
be Brahman, Chhetri and Newar.
Moreover, the private sector is dominated first by Newars
followed by Brahman and Chhetri. These two groups held
about 90 percent of the top positions in prominent Nepali
NGOs and human rights groups in 1999. They have an 80
percent hold in the media industry as editors, publishers and
columnists. These data show that BCN males have enjoyed
most of the power in both state and civil society (Lawoti
2007).
Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Population and Their
Educational Attainment by Caste and Ethnic Groups, 1991
and 2001
Caste and
Ethnic Groups

All Hill/Tarai
Brahman/
Chhetri (B/C)
Hill B/C
Tarai B/C
Tarai Middle
Castes
Dalit
Hill Dalit
Tarai Dalit
Janajati
Hill Janajati
Newar/
Thakali
Other hill
Janajati
Tarai Janajati
Religious
Minorities/
Muslims
Others
Total

Percent of
population 6
years+

Of which, percent literate

SLC and
Total
above
1991 2001 1991 2001
33.8 32.8
57.2
59.4

Graduate
and above
1991 2001
59.2
66.7

Unequal Participation in Bureaucracy
The participation of different caste and ethnic groups in
the government bureaucracy is far from equal. In fact, the
recruitment of gazetted officers (professionals) from Dalits,
Janajatis, Tarai castes, and Muslims did not improve during
the decade post-1990, while that of the Brahman/Chhetri
group increased from 67 to 87 percent for the same period.
The predominance of gazetted officers from the Brahman/
Chhetri group actually increased from 70 to nearly 90 percent
between 1985 and 2002––and both Muslims and Dalits were
almost invisible in government posts (Annex 6).
A similar situation exists in other branches of government.
Among higher level police officers, 79 percent come from
Brahman/Chhetri group, 13 percent from Janajati (only 1%
from the Tarai Janajati), 11 percent from Newar and 0.5
percent from Dalit (Deva 2002). One of the reasons why
Dalit, Janajatis and women are under-represented in these
institutions is that their representation in political parties
was nominal. Thus, the outcomes of political exclusion are
manifested in other dimensions as well.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
31.6
2.2
10.7

30.9
1.9
12.9

49.2
8
8.8

54.3
5.1
9.2

48.9
10.3
6

59.7
7
7.7

11.9
8.8
3.1
35.5
27.7
5.7

11.8
7.1
4.7
37.2
28.5
5.5

1.3
0.9
0.4
29.1
26.3
18.5

1.6
1
0.5
27.4
23.8
12.7

0.7
0.4
0.2
30.1
28.9
23.9

0.8
0.5
0.3
22.3
20.1
13.6

22

23

7.8

11.1

5

6.5

7.9
3.6

8.7
4.3

2.9
1.5

3.7
1.3

1.2
1.6

2.2
1.2

4.4
100

1
100

2.1
100

1
100

2.4
100

1.4
100

Source: TPAMF 2005.

The composition of the parliaments highlights the
exclusion of certain groups. The Brahmans and Chhetris
have held around 60 percent of the parliamentary positions
since 1959. The Newars have hovered just below 10 percent
(Annex 5). In the 14 years since the advent of multi-party
democracy in 1990, only one Dalit was elected to the House of
Representatives. While the Janajatis do make up a substantial
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percentage of the parliament (23%), their representation was
considerably smaller than their proportion in the population
(38%); however, their representation in the Constituent
Assembly (CA) election improved substantially.13
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Based on the analysis of horizontal inequalities in the
preceding section, the key findings are as follows:
i. poverty rates are higher among Dalits, Muslims and
Janajatis in comparison to other castes; and the rate
of poverty reduction is less among these caste and
ethnic groups compared to others, implying growing
economic inequality.
ii. The higher inequality is a result of the low income earned
by Dalits, Janajatis and Muslims because they have
fewer options and only a small number of them work
in administrative and technical positions which have
much better pay than the alternatives available.
iii. The literacy rate among Dalits and Muslims is far less
than that of other caste and ethnic groups; and the
increase in the literacy rate among Dalits and Muslims
is not higher than that of other groups, even as late as
in 2001.
iv. Like literacy rate the proportion of people with SLC
(grade 10) or higher level of education among Dalits,
Muslims and Janajatis was significantly less than their
share in total population. In fact, the proportion of
13. Women have always had a very small political voice and
representation (DFID and World Bank 2005). Their representation in
Parliament has remained at an average of six percent over two decades. In
the recent CA election, women gained 197 of the 601 seats. This represents a
dramatic improvement in the situation of women.

Table 4: Human Development Index by Caste and Ethnic Groups, Nepal, 2006
Life
expectancy
at birth
62.9
68.1
60.6
63.9
61.9
61.0
60.9
61.3
68.0
62.9
63.6
61.5
61.0
63.7

Caste and Ethnic Groups
All Brahman/Chhetri
Hill Brahman(B)
Hill Chhetri (C )
Madhesi B/C
Tarai/Madhesi Other Caste
All Dalit
Hill Dalit
Tarai Dalit
Newar
All Janajati excluding Newar
Hill/Mountain Janajati
Tarai Janajati
Muslim
All Caste and Ethnic Groups

Adult
literacy
63.6
69.9
58.4
83.8
41.8
38.0
45.5
27.3
68.2
51.7
53.8
48.1
30.3
52.4

Mean
year of
schooling
4.4
5.4
3.7
6.4
2.3
1.7
2.1
1.2
4.7
3.0
3.0
2.8
1.6
3.2

Per capita
income (in
PPP US$)
2,027
2,395
1,736
2,333
1,119
977
1,099
743
3,097
1,405
1,490
1,224
890
1,597

Human
Devt Index
0.552
0.612
0.514
0.625
0.450
0.424
0.449
0.383
0.616
0.494
0.507
0.470
0.401
0.509

Source: UNDP/Nepal 2009.

Table 5: Representation of Caste and Ethnic Groups in Different Sectors of Society, Nepal, 1999 and 2005
B/C/T/S

Nationalities

Madhesi

Dalit

Newar

Others

Total

Sector
1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

2005

1999

235

82

42

7

56

9

4

2

36

14

-

-

373

114

Political Sector

97

93

25

20

26

11

-

1

18

14

-

-

166

139

Private Sector

7

21

3

15

30

-

20

42

-

-

42

96

Civil Society

69

94

3

9

8

18

-

1

16

19

-

-

96

141

Total

408

290

70

39

105

68

4

4

90

89

-

-

677

490

Percentage (a)

60.3

59.2

10.3

7.9

15.5

13.9

0.6

0.8

13.3

18.2

100.0

100.0

Caste in Total
Population - %(b)

31.6

30.9

22.1

23.1

30.9

31.5

8.8

7.9

5.6

5.5

1.2 100.0

100.0

1.9

1.9

0.5

0.4

0.5

0.4

0.1

0.1

2.4

3.3

Public Sector

Ratio (a/b)

1.1

2005

Note: The public sector includes supreme court, constitutional bodies, cabinet, Secretaries, lower and upper houses, whereas political sector includes
leaders of political parties. Similarly, private sector refers to leadership of FNCCI (Federation of Nepal Chamber of Commerce and Industries) and
Chamber of Commerce. Civil society includes the chiefs of different professional groups and media house.
Source: Neupane, 2005; Lawoti 2002 and 2007.
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people with higher level of education among Janajatis
decreased during the period 1991-2001, implying
further increase in the social dimension of the
horizontal inequality.
v. The level of human development of excluded groups
such as the Dalits and Muslims is significantly below
that of Brahman/Chhetri and Newar. There has not
been a significant change in the trend of human
development.
vi. The participation of Dalits and Janajati in the three state
organs was much less than that of the Brahman, Chhetri
and Newar. In fact, such an unequal representation has
continued for a long period of time, suggesting that
there are established political inequalities in Nepal.
Thus, the above findings very much support the assertion
that horizontal inequalities are prevalent and increasing in
all four dimensions. Although Marxist leadership seems to be
rarer now in the world, this was the main reason for group
mobilization in Nepal. Socio-economic inequality formed a
solid basis for the mobilization of excluded and poor classes
by Maoist leaders who were unsatisfied with the 1990
constitution and rejected taking part in the parliamentary
elections even after the restoration of democracy in 1990.
While these inequalities are rooted in the long history of
Nepal, why was it at this particular time that a violent rising of
Nepali citizens occurred, resulting in the deaths of thousands
of people and in billions of rupees in property damage? The
reason was that these groups were mobilized by Maoists with
a 40-point demand that touched on all the dimensions of
discrimination and exclusion.
In fact, the Maoist insurgency appealed to ethnic liberation
movements and promised to correct widespread injustices
driven by caste, geography and minority status. The Maoists
had strong appeal for the common masses because it captured
their sentiments. Many Nepalis felt that they had been the
victims of poor governance, neglect, and systemic inequalities,
and that with Maoist rule these problems would be corrected.
The Maoist ideology of the insurgent rebels incorporated the
politics of class struggle and rejected the elite group domination
of political and economic processes. The geographic and caste
support for the rebellion corresponded to the patterns of
social exclusion, with the greatest support for Maoist fighters
in the rural areas most affected by exclusionary practices.
That the conflict lasted for more than a decade is due
mainly to the long and deep-seated horizontal inequalities,
which is evident from the data presented above. It is very
unlikely that there would have been such an enduring conflict
had there not been inequality and exclusion. Therefore, this
validates the two arguments that were posed in the beginning
of the paper that (i) conflict is likely when there is inequality
in social, economic and political dimensions; and (ii) the
conflict thrives when the inequality is growing.
In conclusion the horizontal inequalities—or inequality
between different caste and ethnic groups—provided an
enabling environment for the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. The
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comparison of past and present values of wellbeing indicators
hints that many of these inequalities have worsened in recent
years, resulting in the prolonged continuation of civil war.
Therefore, Nepal might return to conflict if the government
does not address these issues. This requires a transformation
of state and society as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace
Accord, Interim Constitution and other peace agreements and
understandings. It is expected that the upcoming constitution
will take these into account and provide a solid base for
transforming and creating a peaceful, just and prosperous
new Nepal.
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ANNEX 1: Percentage Distribution of Population by Some Social
Characteristics, Nepal, 2001

Population groups
Religion
Hindu
Buddhists
Islam
Kirant
Other
Languages
Nepali
Maithili
Bhojpuri
Tharu
Tamang
Newar
Magar
Others
Caste and Ethnic Groups
Hill/Tarai Brahman/Chhetri (B/C)
Hill
Tarai
Tarai Middle Castes
Dalit
Hill
Tarai
Janajati
Mountain
Hill
Inner Tarai
Tarai
Religious Minorities (Muslim)
Others

Number
22,736,934
18,330,121
2,442,520
954,023
818,106
192,164
22,736,934
11,053,255
2,797,582
1,712,536
1,331,546
1,179,145
825,458
770,116
3,067,296
22,736,934
7,450,564
7,023,219
427,345
2,938,827
2,675,182
1,615,577
1,059,605
8,460,702
177,713
6,056,841
250,460
1,975,688
980,018
231,641

%
100.0
80.6
10.7
4.2
3.6
0.8
100.0
48.6
12.3
7.5
5.9
5.2
3.6
3.4
13.5
100.0
32.8
30.9
1.9
12.9
11.8
7.1
4.7
37.2
0.8
26.6
1.1
8.7
4.3
1.0

Note: Because of the higher status of the Newar, at times they are not included in the Janajati. The Newar population
consists of 5.5% of the total population. Therefore, if Newar is excluded, the proportion of Janajati is less than 32
percent of the total population.
Source: CBS 2003, Vol I; and UNDP/RIPP and NTG 2006.
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ANNEX 2: Nepal: Poverty Incidence by Geographical Region
1995/96 and 2003/04

Geographic Region
Sector
Urban
Rural
NLSS Regions
Kathmandu
Other Urban
Rural Western Hill
Rural Eastern Hill
Rural Western Tarai
Rural Eastern Tarai
Development Region
Eastern
Central
Western
Mid-Western
Far-Western
Ecological Belt
Mountain
Hill
Tarai
Nepal

Poverty Head Count Rate (%)
1995/96
21.6
43.3

2003/04
9.6
34.6

% Change
-56
-20

4.3
31.6
55.0
36.1
46.1
37.2

3.3
13.0
37.4
42.9
38.1
24.9

-23
-59
-32
19
-17
-33

38.9
32.5
38.6
59.9
63.9

29.3
27.1
27.1
44.8
41.0

-25
-17
-30
-25
-36

57.0
40.7
40.3
41.8

32.6
34.5
27.6
30.8

-43
-15
-32
-26

Note: NLSS refers to Nepal Living Standards Survey. This survey has
been designed in such a way that it can provide estimates of poverty
rate at the following level of dis-aggregations: rural and urban, three
ecological regions; five development regions; and six NLSS regions.
Source: CBS 2005.

ANNEX 3: Average per capita (urban/rural) income (NRs.) by caste and ethnic groups
Avg. per capita
income (NRs.)
18,400

Avg.
household size

Avg. per capita
urban (NRs.)
33,731

Avg. per capita
rural (NRs.)
15,674

Hill

16,200

5.78

34,678

13,628

Tarai

23,900

5.54

32,408

21,465

Tarai Middle Caste

11,300

7.22

12,736

11,212

All Dalit

10,000

19,381

9,026

Caste and Ethnic Groups
All Brahman/Chhetri (B/C)

Hill

8,830

5.64

18,602

8,018

Tarai

13,200

5.98

20,460

11,927

Newar

26,100

6.43

36,600

14,660

All Janajati

13,300

25,750

12,216

Hill

13,500

5.97

26,448

11,987

Tarai

12,700

9.68

14,106

12,719

Muslim

10,200

8.29

11,563

10,126

Nepal

15,000

28,957

12,534

Note: NRs. refers to Nepali Rupees.
Source: CBS 2005.
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ANNEX 4: Occupational Distribution of Labour Force by Caste and Ethnic Groups, 1991 and 2001
Percentage of the Economically Active Population aged 10-year and
above by Caste and Ethnic Groups
Administrative
Proportion of
Prof/Tech. Workers
Workers
Population
1991
2001
1991
2001
1991
2001
3.2
8.1
0.5
1 33.8
32.8
3
7.8
0.5
1
31.6
30.9
7.1
12.2
1
1.7
2.2
1.9
1.8
3
0.1
0.3
10.7
12.9
0.2
0.6
0
0.1
11.9
11.8
0.2
0.7
0
0.1
8.8
7.1
0.3
0.5
0
0
3.1
4.7
1.2
3.3
0.3
0.5
35.5
37.2
1.2
3.6
0.3
0.6
27.7
28.5
3.4
8.4
1.4
1.7
5.7
5.5

Caste and Ethnic Groups

Hill/Tarai Brahman/Chhetri (B/C)
Hill B/C
Tarai B/C
Tarai Middle Caste
Dalits
Hill Dalits
Tarai Dalits
Janajatis
Hill Janajatis
Newar/Thakali
Other Hill Janajatis
Tarai Janajatis

0.8
1

2.1
1.9

0.1
0.1

0.3
0.2

22
7.9

23
8.7

Religious Minorities/Muslims

1.1

1.7

0.2

0.2

3.6

4.3

Others
Total

0.9
1.8

4.3
4.6

0.1
0.3

0.8
0.6

4.4
100

1
100

Source: TPAMF 2005.

ANNEX 5: Representation of Different Caste and Ethnic Groups in Parliament, Nepal, 1959-1999

Caste and
Ethnic Groups
Brahman
Chhetri
Newar
Janajati except
Newar
Tarai High &
Middle Caste
Muslim
Dalit
Total

1959

1967*

1978*

1981*

1986*

1991

1994

No. %
No. %
No. %
No. %
No. %
No. %
No. %
No. %
30
28
30
24
27
21
14
13
23
21
77
38
86
42
77
38
34
31
47
38
46
36
41
37
43
38
39
19
40
20
44
22
4 3.7
15
12
10
7.9
9
8
7 6.3
14 6.8
13 6.3
14 6.8
21

19

21

17

28

22

36

32

29

26

48

23

38

19

35

17

18

17

11

8.8

11

11

10

8.9

10

8.9

21

10

24

12

27

13

2
0
109

1.8
0
100

0
0
125

0
0
100

1
0
127

0.8
0
100

2
0
112

1.8
0
100

0
0
112

0
0
100

5
0
205

2.8
0
100

4
0
205

1.9
0
100

2
0
205

0.9
0
100

UNDP/RIPP and NTG 2006; and Neupane 2005.

ANNEX 6: Composition in Gazetted Level Employees by Caste and Ethnic Groups (by percent)

Caste and
Ethnic
Groups
Brahman
Chhetri
Newar
Janajati
Dalit
Madhesi
Total

Special
Class
63.2
15.8
18.4
2.6
0.0
0.0
100.0

Total
Positions

Gazetted Level
First Class

Second Class

57.9
15.9
17.1
0.8
0.8
7.6
100.0

54.4
13.2
17.5
3.3
0.5
11.1
100.0

Source: Civil Service Documentation Centre 2006.
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Third Class
59.8
13.2
12.7
3.4
1.1
9.7
100.0

No

%

4,721
1,080
1,152
264
74
805
8,096

58.3
13.3
14.2
3.3
0.9
9.9
100.0

